MULLANEY v. WILBUR
421 U.S. 684, 95 sect. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975).
MR, JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
POWELL(鮑威爾)法官交付法庭的意見。
The State of Maine requires a defendant charged with murder to prove that he acted ''in the heat of passion on sudden provocation'' in order to reduce the homicide to manslaughter. We must decide whether this rule comport with the due process requirement, as defined in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970), that the prosecution prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged.
緬因州為了降低謀殺凶案以過失殺人罪的認定，要求被指控謀殺的一個被告證明他"受突發挑釁在盛怒下的時候"行動，。 我們必須決定這條規則是否與正當程序的要求相符，In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970),控方證明超越合理懷疑一切必要的事實構成犯罪的指控。
I
In June 1966 a jury found respondent Stillman E. Wilbur, Jr.,
guilty of murder. The case against him rested on his own pretrial statement and on circumstantial evidence showing that he fatally assaulted Claude Hebert in the latter's hotel room. Respondent's statement, introduced by the prosecution, claimed that he had attacked Hebert in a frenzy provoked by Hebert's homosexual advance. The defense offered no evidence, but argued that the homicide was not unlawful since respondent lacked criminal intent. Alternatively, Wilbur's counsel asserted that at most the homicide was manslaughter rather than murder, since it occurred in the heat of passion provoked by the homosexual assault.
1966年6月 ，一個陪審團認定被告Stillman E. Wilbur, Jr犯有謀殺罪。 不利於他的案件放在他自己的審前的陳述上，和關於間接證據顯示他在Claude Hebert(克勞德‧赫伯特)的飯店房間施予致命突擊。被訴人的聲明透過檢察機關(prosecution)的介紹，聲稱他已經因為在同性戀愛的發展被激起的狂亂裡攻擊Hebert(赫伯特)。辯方(Respondent)被告沒有提供證據，但是表明因為被訴人缺乏犯罪意圖，殺人不是不合法的。另外，Wilbur(威爾伯)的律師稱：最多是一宗誤殺的過失殺人而不是謀殺， 因為它在透過同性戀愛處在突然挑釁下盛怒的時候發生。
The trial court instructed the jury that Maine law recognizes two kinds of homicide, murder and manslaughter, and that these offenses are not subdivided into different degrees. The common elements of both are that the homicide be unlawful-i.e., neither justifiable nor excusable-and that it be intentional. The prosecution is required to prove these elements by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and only if they are so proved is the jury to consider the distinction between murder and manslaughter.
初審法院指示陪審團 ，緬因州法律承認兩種殺人，謀殺和一般殺人，而這些犯罪行為沒有細分為不同程度的。 共同的要件都是殺人是非法的，也就是說，它是故意的，而且沒有充分理由可以原諒的。檢察機關(prosecution)被要求透過證據證明這些要素是超出合理的懷疑，而且只有當他們是如此證明，是陪審團考慮謀殺和一般殺人之間的區分。
In view of the evidence the trial court drew particular attention to the difference between murder and manslaughter. After reading the statutory definitions of both offenses, the court charged that “malice aforethought is an essential and indispensable element of the crime of murder,” App. 40, without which the homicide would be manslaughter. The jury was further instructed, however, that if the prosecution established that the homicide was both intentional and unlawful, malice aforethought was to be conclusively implied unless the defendant proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. The court emphasized that ''malice aforethought and heat of passion on sudden provocation are two inconsistent things,'' id., at 62; thus, by proving the latter the defendant would negate the former and reduce the homicide from murder to manslaughter. The court then concluded its charge with elaborate definitions of ''heat of passion'' and ''sudden provocation.''
鑑於證據 ，審判法庭特別提請特別注意謀殺和一般殺人的區別。在閱讀兩個犯罪的法定定義之後，法庭指控說：「惡意預謀是必要與不可或缺的犯罪謀殺。」如果沒有這些，殺人將是一般殺人。陪審團還指示，如果檢察機關確定 ，殺人既是蓄意又不合法，陪審團不過被更進一步指示那個惡意預謀將被確實表示， 除非被告被證明他在突然挑釁的盛怒時候之行動已達到是優勢證據程度。透過法庭強調'：「預謀的行為和突然挑釁下的盛怒是兩個互相抵觸的東西，」id.，在62； 因此，透過證明後者被告將否認前者，並且殺人罪行將由謀殺降低到過失殺人。法庭隨後以「盛怒」和「突然的挑釁」製作的精心定義來結束它的指控。
After retiring to consider its verdict, the jury twice returned to request further instruction. It first sought reinstructing on the doctrine of implied malice aforethought, and later on the definition of “heat of passion.” Shortly after the second reinstructing, the jury found respondent guilty of murder.
在非常謹慎的考慮其裁決之後，他兩次返回陪審團要求進一步指示。它首先諭示的原則（突然的挑釁行動）隱含預謀，。不久後來的第二個諭示定義（突然的挑釁行動）是在盛怒時發生，陪審團裁定被告犯有謀殺罪。
Respondent appealed to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, arguing that he had been denied due process because he was required to negate the element of malice aforethought by proving that he had acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. He claimed that under Maine law malice aforethought was an essential element of the crime of murder-indeed that it was the sole element distinguishing murder from manslaughter. Respondent contended, therefore, that this Court's decision in Winship requires the prosecution to prove the existence of that element beyond a reasonable doubt.
答辯者上訴到緬因州最高法院的法庭，表明他已經被拒不給予正當的程序， 因為他被要求透過證明他的行動是在被突然挑釁的盛怒時候發生，以否認預謀的要素。他聲稱在緬因州法律下，惡意預謀是分辨謀殺和一般殺人的唯一要素，也的確是一個謀殺犯罪的重要內容。 因此，在溫希普(Winship)這個法院裡的裁決要求控方證明該元素（預謀）的存在無可置疑。
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court rejected this contention, holding that in Maine murder and manslaughter are not distinct crimes but, rather, different degrees of the single generic offense of felonious homicide. State v. Wilbur, 278 A.2d 139 (1971). The court further stated that for more than a century it repeatedly had held that the prosecution could rest on a presumption of implied malice aforethought and require the defendant to prove that he had acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation in order to reduce murder to manslaughter. With respect to Winship, which was decided after respondent's trial, the court noted that it did not anticipate the application of the Winship principle to a factor such as the heat of passion on sudden provocation.
緬因州最高法院的法庭駁回了這一論點， 認為在謀殺和一般殺人罪差別並不明顯，相反，而是不同程度的單一重罪的殺人。State v. Wilbur, 278 A.2d 139 (1971).法院還指出，適合一個多世紀的規定，它反覆認為控方可能取決於暗示預謀的推定，並要求被告證明為了把謀殺降低到一般殺人，他的行動是在被突然挑釁下的盛怒時候發生。關於溫希普(Winship) 法院裡的裁決，這是在被告的審判之後被決定，最高法院的法庭注意到它沒預期對一個原素，例如在被突然挑釁的盛怒時候的溫希普(Winship) 法院原則的應用（要求控方證明該元素的存在無可置疑）。
Respondent next successfully petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in Federal District Court. Wilbur v. Robbins, 349 usurp. 149 (Me.1972). The District Court ruled that under the Maine statutes murder and manslaughter are distinct offenses, not different degrees of a single offense. The court further held that ''〔m〕alice aforethought is made the distinguishing element of the offense of murder, and it is expressly excluded as an element of the offense of manslaughter.'' Id., at 153.Thus, the District Court concluded, Winship requires the prosecution to prove malice aforethought beyond a reasonable doubt; it cannot rely on a presumption of implied malice, which requires the defendant to prove that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation.
下一個答辯者成功在聯邦地方初審法院申請求一個人身保護令。 Wilbur v. Robbins, 349 usurp. 149 (Me.1972) 區域法院裁定，在緬因州法規謀殺和一般殺人罪是不同的，而不是不同程度的一個單一的罪。法庭更進一步拿「惡意預謀作為謀殺罪的一項突出內容，這是要明文排除作為一般殺人罪的一個元素。」Id.，在153. 因而，區域法院結論，溫希普(Winship) 法院的裁決，要求控方超出合理的懷疑證明預謀；它不能倚賴惡意暗示推定，要求被告證明他這樣做是在被突然挑釁的盛怒時候。
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, subscribing in general to the District Court's analysis and construction of Maine law.
473 F.2d 943 (1973). Although recognizing that “within broad limits a state court must be the one to interpret its own laws,” the court nevertheless ruled that “a totally insupportable construction which leads to an invasion of constitutional due process is a federal matter.” Id., at 945. The Court of Appeals equated malice aforethought with ''premeditation,'' id., at 947, and concluded that Winship requires the prosecution to prove this fact beyond a reasonable doubt.
第一巡迴上訴法院肯定，通常同意在一般區域法院的分析和緬因州的法律解釋。 473 F. 2 d 943 ( 1973 ) . 雖然認識到，「在廣泛的範圍州法院必須是一個解釋自己的法律，」然而 ， 法院裁定，「完全無法忍受建立一個裁判而導致入侵憲法正當程序的一個聯邦問題。」Id., at 945. 上訴法院裁決等同於有預謀的"預謀"，並且下結論，溫希普(Winship) 法院的裁決原則，要求控方證明這個事實超出合理的懷疑。
Following this decision, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court decided the case of State v. Lafferty, 309 A.2d 647 (1973), in which it sharply disputed the First Circuit's view that it was entitled to make an independent determination of Maine law. The Maine court also reaffirmed its earlier opinion that murder and manslaughter are punishment categories of the single offense of felonious homicide. Accordingly, if the prosecution proves a felonious homicide the burden shift's to the defendant to prove that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation in order to receive the lesser penalty prescribed for man- slaughter.
繼這個決定之後，緬因州最高司法法院的判案State v. Lafferty，309 A. 2 d 647 ( 1973 ) ,其中，第一巡迴法庭大幅有爭議的觀點 ，即它有權作出獨立意見決定緬因州法律。緬因州法院也重申了早些時候認定 ，謀殺和一般殺人通常是處罰類別不同程度的單一殺人的重罪。 因此， 如果控方證明殺人重罪的負擔轉移至由被告證明他的行動是在被突然挑釁的盛怒時候，以獲得較輕刑罰規定的人為宰殺。
In view of the Lafferty decision we granted certiorari in this case and remanded to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration. 414 U.S.
1139 (1974). On remand, that court again applied Winship, this time to the Maine law as construed by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court. 496 F.2d 1303 (1974). Looking to the ''substance'' of that law, the court found that the presence or absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation results in significant differences in the penalties and stigma attaching to conviction. For these reasons the Court of Appeals held that the principles enunciated in Winship control, and that to establish murder the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in the heat of passion on sudden provocation.
由於Lafferty(拉弗蒂)乙案，決定我們承認在這例案件裡的移審令，並且為重新考慮到上訴法院申請復議。414 U.S.1139 (1974). 在重審過程中，該上訴法院再次採用溫希普 (Winship)法院原則，這一次是在緬因州法律像透過緬因州的最高司法法院的解釋那樣。 496 F. 2 d 1303 ( 1974 ) . 注意那條法律的"要旨"，法院認定存在或缺乏突發挑釁下的盛怒造成懲罰和羞辱附加定罪的顯著的差別。由於這些原因，上訴法院認為，在溫希普( Winship) 所闡明的原則控制， 並建立控方必須證明被告這樣做不是在被突然挑釁的盛怒時候而採取超出合理的懷疑的謀殺行為。
Because of the importance of the issues presented, we again granted certiorari. 419 U.S. 823 (197*. We now affirm.
因為提出的那些問題的重要性，我們再次獲得更審令。419 U.S. 823 (197*. ) 我們現下肯定
II
. . . [W]e accept as binding the Maine Supreme Judicial Court's construction of state homicide law.
. .我們接受具有約束力的緬因州最高司法法院的法治國家殺人之法律解釋。
III
The Maine law of homicide, as it bears on this case, can be stated succinctly: Absent Justification or excuse, all intentional or criminally reckless killing are felonious homicides. Felonious homicide is punished as murder-i.e., by life imprisonment-unless the defendant proves by a fair preponderance of the evidence that it was committed in the heat of passion on sudden provocation, in which case it is punished as manslaughter-i.e., by a fine not to exceed $1,000 or by imprisonment not to exceed 20 years. The issue is whether the Maine rule requiring the defendant to prove that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation accords with due process.
在緬因州殺人的法律，當它與這例案件有關時，可以被簡明說明︰不論任何的理由或者辯解，所有故意或刑法上的濫殺是殺人重罪。殺人重罪處罰案件列為謀殺案，即處以終身監禁；除非被告證明了一個公正優勢的證據表明其行動處在突然挑釁下的盛怒時候，在這種情況下，即作為過失殺人處罰，也就是說，罰款不超過1,000美元或監禁不超過20年。問題是， 緬因州規定 ， 要求被告證明他的行動是處在最激烈的激情突然挑釁的時候，符合規章與正當程序。
A
Our analysis may be illuminated if this issue is placed in historical context. At early common law only those homicides committed in the enforcement of justice were considered justifiable; all others were deemed unlawful and were punished by death. Gradually, however, the severity of the common-law punishment for homicide abated. Between the 13th and 16th centuries the class of justifiable homicides expanded to include, for example, accidental homicides and those committed in self-defense. Concurrently, the wide-spread use of capital punishment was ameliorated further by extension of the ecclesiastic Jurisdiction. Almost any person able to read was eligible for “benefit of clergy,” a procedural device that effected a transfer from the secular to the ecclesiastic jurisdiction. And under ecclesiastic law a person who committed an unlawful homicide was not executed; instead he received a one-year sentence, had his thumb branded and was required to forfeit his goods. At the turn of the 16th century, English rulers, concerned with the accretion of ecclesiastic jurisdiction at the expense of the secular, enacted a series of statutes eliminating the benefit of clergy in all cases of “murder of malice prepensed.” Unlawful homicides that were committed without such malice were designated ''manslaughter,'' and their perpetrators remained eligible for the benefit of clergy.
如果這個問題被放在歷史背景裡，我們的分析可能被照亮。在早期的普通法只有在實施公正（執行司法）過程中犯那些殺人作為被認為是正當；全部其他的殺人是被認為不合法且被處以死刑。不過，普通法對殺人的嚴厲處罰逐漸地減少。在第13和16世紀之間正當的殺人種類擴大，例如包括過失殺人和和那些承諾自衛。同時，廣泛的使用死刑 ，改善牧師權限（裁判權）被更進一步的擴展。幾乎任何人可以閱讀有資格為「效益神職人員」的程序裝置 ，實現了一次轉移從世俗到牧師審判權的一個過程的設備。在牧師的法律下，任何人犯下非法殺人，是沒有得到死刑的執行，相反，而是他接受1年徒刑，讓人把他的拇指烙印和被要求沒收其貨物。在進入16世紀，英國時統治者，以世俗作為代價關心牧師審判權的增大，制定了一系列法規，消除神職人員在任何情況下享受的法律上特權(在惡意prepensed的urder的全部案件裡消除神職人員在法律上享受的特權)。 被承諾沒有惡意、不合法的殺人犯被指定為"過失殺人"，並且他們做壞事的人仍保持適合神職人員在法律上享受的特權利益。
Even after ecclesiastic jurisdiction was eliminated for all secular offenses the distinction between murder and manslaughter persisted. It was said that "manslaughter, when voluntary, arises from the sudden heat of the passions, murder from the wickedness of the heart." 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries * 190. Malice aforethought was designated as the element that distinguished the two crimes, but it was recognized that such malice could be implied by law as well as proved by evidence. Absent proof that an unlawful homicide resulted from ''sudden and sufficiently violent provocation,'' the homicide was “presumed to be malicious.” Id., at * 201. In view of this presumption, the early English authorities, relying on the case of The King v. Oneby, 92Eng.Rep. 465 (K.B.1727), held that once the prosecution proved that the accused had committed the homicide, it was ''incumbent upon the prisoner to make out, to the satisfaction of the court and jury'' “all . . . circumstances of justification, excuse, or alleviation.'' 4 W.
Blackstone, Commentaries * 201. . . . Thus, at common law the burden of proving heat of passion on sudden provocation appears to have rested on the defendant.
即使在牧師審判權被為全部世俗消除之後，犯罪謀殺和過失殺人之間區別依然存在。有人說，「過失殺人，是自願的，起因於突然的激情時；而謀殺來自邪惡的心」"，4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries * 190. （4 W. 布萊克斯通，評論* 190）。預謀被區分為兩種指定犯罪的要素，但是認識到法律可能表示和被證據證明這樣的惡意。一個非法的殺人起因於缺乏「突然和足夠激烈的挑釁」的證據，殺人是被「推定為惡意。」 Id.，在* 201 由於這推測，早期的英國當局，依靠The King v. Oneby的案件，92Eng.Rep.465(K.B. 1727) , 認為一旦控方證明被告犯有殺人，這是「有義務責任為囚犯向法院和陪審團提出令人滿意的理由」「所有全部的……情況下的理由，辯解，或減輕」4 W. 布萊克斯通，評論*201.（4 W.Blackstone, Commentaries * 201） . . .因此，在普通法負擔證明行動是在突然挑釁下的盛怒時候似乎已經落在被告身上。
In this country the concept of malice aforethought took on two distinct meanings: in some jurisdictions it came to signify a substantive element of intent, requiring the prosecution to prove that the defendant intended to kill or to inflict great bodily harm; in other jurisdictions it remained a policy presumption, indicating only that absent proof to the contrary a homicide was presumed not to have occurred in the heat of passion. . . . In a landmark came, Commonwealth v. York, 50 Mass. (9 Met,) 93 (1845), Chief Justice Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the defendant was required to negate malice aforethought by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of passion. Initially, York was adopted in Maine as well as several other jurisdictions. In 1895, however, in the context of deciding a question of federal criminal procedure, this Court explicitly considered and unanimously rejected the general approach articulated in York. Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469. And, in the past half century, the large majority of States have abandoned York and now require the prosecution to prove the absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .
在這個國家預謀的概念呈現兩種不同的含義：在某些司法管轄區它來象徵實質性要素的意圖，要求控方證明被告企圖殺害或造成重大人身傷害；但在其他司法管轄區仍維持推定的政策，只是表示那個缺席的反面證據，推定一宗兇殺案的沒有發生在突然挑釁下的盛怒時候 . . . 在一個具有里程碑意義的到來，在聯邦訴紐約的案例Commonwealth v. York, 50 Mass. (9 Met,) 93 (1845)，麻薩諸塞州最高法院的首席法官邵（Shaw）認為被告被要求通過他的行動是在突然挑釁下的盛怒時候之優勢證據來證明，以否認預謀。最初，紐約的案例是通過了緬因州以及若干其他司法管轄區而採用。然而在1895年，鑑於決定一個聯邦刑事訴訟程序的問題，這個法院明確地認為並一致拒絕在紐約案例中清楚明說的通用方法。Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469.（戴維斯 v聯邦，160美國 469.） 而且，在過去半個世紀中，國家的大多數地區已經拋棄紐約案例的通說，現在要求控方證明在突然挑釁下的盛怒時候之行動缺乏超出合理的懷疑……..。
This historical review establishes two important points. First, the fact at issue here-the presence or absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation-has been, almost from the inception of the common law of homicide, the single most important factor in determining the degree of culpability attaching to an unlawful homicide. And, second, the clear trend has been toward requiring the prosecution to ' bear the ultimate burden of proving this fact. . . .
這種歷史回顧建立兩個要點。首先，這裡的那些在爭論中的事實存在或者缺乏突然挑釁下的盛怒，幾乎從一開始普通法的殺人案，最重要的因素在決定負的罪責程度附加到一個非法的殺人犯身上方面。其次，明確的趨勢是向控方要求承擔最終責任證明這一事實………..
B
Petitioners, the warden of the Maine Prison and the State of Maine, argue that despite these considerations Winship should not be extended to the present case. They note that as a formal matter the absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation is not a ''fact necessary to constitute the crime'' of felonious homicide in Maine, In re Winship, 397 U.S., at 364 (emphasis supplied). This distinction is relevant, according to petitioners, because in Wirtship the facts at issue were essential to establish criminality in the first instance, whereas the fact in question here does not come into play until the jury already has determined that the defendant is guilty and may be punished at least for manslaughter. In this situation, petitioners maintain, the defendant's critical interests in liberty and reputation are no longer of paramount concern since, irrespective of the presence or absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation, he is likely to lose his liberty and certain to be stigmatized. In short, petitioners would limit win- ship to those facts which, if not proved, would wholly exonerate the defendant.
請願者：緬因州監獄典獄長和國家緬因州，認為，儘管有這些因素考慮，溫希普（Winship）法院裁決原則不應該被延伸到本案。他們指出， 在緬因州，作為一個正式的事項缺乏突然挑釁下的盛怒行動是不是事實，是一個殺人重罪「構成犯罪的必要的事實」的依據，In re Winship, 397 U.S., at 364（重點提供）這種區別是相關的，根據請願者，在在爭論中的事實對Winship很重要的，首先建立犯罪性，而事實上，在這裡的問題不發揮作用，直到陪審團已經裁定被告有罪，可能被處以至少過失殺人。在這種情況下，請願者維護被告的關鍵利益，自由和聲譽已不再是首要關切的，因為不管存在或缺乏突然挑釁的氣憤，他很可能失去他的自由和確定蒙受恥辱。總之，請願者如果不能證明，將完全開脫被告，那將限制得「勝利船」的事實。
This analysis fails to recognize that the criminal law of Maine, like that of other jurisdictions, is concerned not only with guilt or innocence in the abstract but also with the degree of criminal culpability. Maine has chosen to distinguish those who kill in the heat of passion from those who kill in the absence of this factor. Because the former are less ''blameworth﹝y﹞,'' State v. Lafferty, 309 A.2d, at 671, 673 (concurring opinion), they are subject to substantially less severe penalties. By drawing this distinction, while refusing to require the prosecution to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the fact upon which it turns, Maine denigrates the interests found critical in Winship.
這種分析是沒有認識到緬因州的刑事法，如同其他司法管轄區那樣，是不僅關注抽象的有罪或無罪，也符合刑事罪責的等級。緬因州已經選擇那些區分在來自缺乏這個原素的情況下，那些殺死人的，是在激情最激烈的時候殺人。因為前者較少受責備。State v. Lafferty（國家訴拉費蒂）, 309 A.2d, at 671, 673（同意意見），他們受到嚴厲的懲罰大大減少。透過抽籤這種區別，同時拒絕控方要求建立無可置疑的曲折事實依據，緬因州發現詆毀中傷溫希普（Winship）關鍵的利益。
The safeguards of due process are not rendered unavailing simply because a determination may already have been reached that would stigmatize the defendant and that might lead to a significant impairment of personal liberty. The fact remains that the consequences resulting from a verdict of murder, as compared with a verdict of manslaughter, differ significantly. Indeed, when viewed in terms of the potential difference in restrictions of personal liberty attendant to each conviction, the distinction established by Maine between murder and manslaughter may be of greater importance than the difference between guilt or innocence for many lesser crimes.
在保障正當程序都不會呈現徒勞，僅僅因為一個決心可能已經達成羞辱被告且可能導致重大損害個人的自由。事實是，造成裁決謀殺的後果，與一個一般殺人的裁決相比較，相當不同。的確，就對伴隨每一個信念的限制人身自由的潛在差異方面觀之，緬因州建立謀殺和一般殺人之間的區別，與很多較小犯罪的在有罪或無罪之間的差別相比較，可能是更重要的。
Moreover, if Winship were limited to those facts that constitute a crime as defined by state law, a State could undermine many of the interests that decision sought to protect without effecting any substantive change in its law. It would only be necessary to redefine the elements that constitute different crimes, characterizing them as factors that bear solely on the extent of punishment. An extreme example of this approach can be fashioned from the law challenged in this case. Maine divides the single generic offense of felonious homicide into three distinct punishment categories-murder, voluntary man- slaughter, and involuntary manslaughter. Only the first two of these categories require that the homicidal act either be intentional or the result of criminally reckless conduct. … But under Maine law these facts of intent are not general elements of the crime of felonious homicide. . . . Instead, they bear only on the appropriate punishment category. Thus, if petitioners' argument were accepted, Maine could impose a life sentence for any felonious homicide-even those that traditionally might be considered involuntary manslaughter- unless the defendant was able to prove that his act was neither intentional nor criminally reckless.
而且， 如果溫希普（Winship）局限於那些構成犯罪的事實正如州法律所規定的，一個國家能破壞很多的利益 ， 決定不尋求保護改變實質性效益的法律。 這將只需要重新定義構成犯罪的不同因素，描述他們為僅僅在忍受處罰的程度因素。一個這種方法的極端例子，這種方法可以從老式的法律在這種情況下提出質疑。緬因州的殺人重罪一般分為三個不同的處罰類別：謀殺（murder）、蓄意殺人的故意殺人（voluntary manslaughter）和非蓄意殺人的過失殺人（involuntary；只這些類別的前兩個要求殺人的行為，或者有意，或者犯罪輕率的行為的結果。….. 但是在緬因州法律的目的下，這些事實不是殺人重罪的一般犯罪的要素。……. 相反，他們只承擔相應的處罰類別。因此， 如果請願者的辯論被接受，緬因州可能對任何殺人重罪皆判處無期徒刑，即使是那些傳統上可能被視為過失殺人，除非被告能夠證明他的行為旣非故意也沒有魯莽輕率犯罪意圖。
Winship is concerned with substance rather than this kind of formalism. The rationale of that case requires an analysis that looks to the “operation and effect of the law as applied and enforced by the state,” St. Louis S. W, R. Co. v. Arkansas, 235 U.S. 350, 362 (1914), and to the interests of both the State and the defendant as affected by the allocation of the burden of proof.
In Winship the Court emphasized the societal interests in the reliability of jury verdicts:
溫希普（Winship）關注的是實體的，而不是這種形式主義。要求對該案進行分析的理由，指望「國家的執行和適用法律的運作和效力」，St. Louis S. W, R. Co. v. Arkansas（美國聖路易斯 糯河公司v阿肯色州）, 235 U.S. 350, 362 (1914), 基於國家和被告的雙方利益，而受到舉證責任的分配。
“The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt has [a] vital role in our criminal procedure for cogent reasons. The accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake interests of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction……..
在溫希普（Winship）法院強調社會對陪審團裁決可靠性的興趣︰
該規定的證據在合理的懷疑以外的要求有至關重要的作用，在我們的刑事程序裡有令人信服的有力理由。 被告人在刑事檢控攸關的利益極為重要，不僅因為他有可能經定罪而失去自由 ， 也因為他肯定會受到羞辱的信念... ... ..
Moreover, use of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in applications of the criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned.'' 397 U.S., at 363, 364.
These interests are implicated to a greater degree in this case than they were in Winship itself. Petitioner there faced an 18-month sentence, with a maximum possible extension of an additional four and one-half years, id., at 360, whereas respondent here faces a differential in sentencing ranging from a nominal fine to a mandatory life sentence. Both the stigma to the defendant and the community's confidence in the administration of the criminal law are also of greater consequence in this case, since the adjudication of delinquency involved in Winship was ''benevolent'' in intention, seeking to provide “a generously conceived program of compassionate treatment.” Id., at 376 (Burger, C.J.,dissenting).
此外，使用合理懷疑的標準，在刑法的應用過程中，社會的尊重和信任是必不可少的。對是否無罪的人正被判刑而感到疑惑，刑事法的道德力量不被一個離開人的標準;證據所稀釋這是至關重要的。397 U.S., at 363, 364. 與他們在溫希普（Winship）自己比，這些利益在這種情況下牽連在更大程度上比 。申訴人有面對 18個月的刑期，由於另外延長增加4和1年半的最大可能，id.，在360，而被告在這裡面臨著差別量刑範圍從罰款的名義向被判處終身監禁。在這種情況下，無論是被告的恥辱和社會的信賴，在行政管理刑事法律，也是更嚴重的後果。因為裁決所涉及的犯罪，涉及溫希普（Winship）在「仁慈」的意圖，試圖提供「慷慨的構思富有同情心的處理程序」。Id.，at 376 (Burger, C.J.,dissenting不同意).
Not only are the interests underlying Wingtip implicated to a greater degree in this case, but in one respect the protection afforded those interests is less here. In Winship the ultimate burden of persuasion remained with the prosecution, although the standard had been reduced to proof by a fair preponderance of the evidence. In this case, by contrast, the State has affirmatively shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. The result, in a case such as this one where the defendant is required to prove the critical fact in dispute, is to increase further the likelihood of an erroneous murder conviction. Such a result directly contravenes the principle articulated in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-526 (1958):
在這種情況下，不僅牽連溫希普（Winship）很大程度的相關利益，但在某一方面所提供的保護這些利益是少得很。在這種情況下，在溫希普（Winship）雖然那些標準被降低，但是那些最後舉証責任屬於控方，標準仍僅減至證明了一個公平優勢的證據。相比之下，國家轉移舉證責任給被告。這樣的話，對比起來，官方肯定的移動舉証責任給被告。結果，在一例案件， 被告必須證明關鍵事實爭議， 將更進一步增加一次錯誤的謀殺定罪的可能性。這樣的一個結果直接違反在Speiser v. Randall（斯佩瑟v.蘭德爾）案例裡闡明的該原則 。 Speiser v. Randal, 357 U.S. 513, 525-526 (1958):
''[W]here one party has at stake an interest of transcending value-as a criminal defendant his liberty-th[e] margin of error is reduced as to him by the process of placing on the ﹝prosecution﹞the burden . … of persuading the factfinder at the conclusion of the trial . . . .''
'' [我們]這裡一方的利益超越攸關作為刑事被告人的人身自由價值，保證金的錯誤，以減少他的過程造成控方的負擔。在審訊結束說服事實發現者。 . . .
C
It has been suggested, State v. Wilbur, 278 A.2d, at 145, that because of the difficulties in negating an argument that the homicide was committed in the heat of passion the burden of proving this fact should rest on the defendant. No doubt this is often a heavy burden for the prosecution to satisfy. The same may be said of the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of many controverted facts in a criminal trial. But this is the traditional burden which our system of criminal Justice deems essential.
有人建議，State v. Wilbur（國家訴韋爾伯）, 278 A.2d, at 145，指出要讓被告負擔證明殺人是發生在突然挑釁的盛怒下的這一事實，因為否定一種說法是困難的 。毫無疑問，這往往是一個滿足起訴的沉重負擔。同樣可以說是要求證明在刑事審判中之無可置疑的許多有爭議的事實，但這是我們的刑事司法系統認為必要的傳統的負擔。
Indeed, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court itself acknowledged that most States require the prosecution to prove the absence of passion beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., at 146. Moreover, the difficulty of meeting such an exacting burden is mitigated in Maine where the fact at issue is largely an ''objective, rather than a subjective, behavioral criterion.'' State v. Rollins, 295 A.2d, at 920. In this respect, proving that the defendant did not act in the heat of passion on sudden provocation is similar to proving any other element of intent; it may be established by adducing evidence of the factual circumstances surrounding the commission of the homicide. And although intent is typically considered a fact peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant, this does ' not, as the Court has long recognized, justify shifting the burden to him. .
事實上，緬因州最高的法院本身承認，大多數國家要求控方超出合理的懷疑證明缺乏氣憤。Id., at 146. 此外，事實上在緬因州，他難以滿足這種嚴格的負擔減輕了，在這個問題主要是「意圖，而不是主觀的行為準則」。State v. Rollins（國家訴羅林斯）, 295 A.2d, at 920. 在這方面，證明被告沒有在突然挑釁的盛怒下採取行動之類似證明的任何其他因素的意圖；它可能透過圍繞該兇殺案委員會提出實際的情況以建立舉證。雖然意圖通常認為有著被告特別考慮事實在內的知識範圍，但這「不」， 如同法院早就認識到，證明責任轉嫁給他是正確的。
Nor is the requirement of proving a negative unique in our system of criminal jurisprudence. Maine itself requires the prosecution to prove the absence of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
Satisfying this burden imposes an obligation that, in all practical effect, is identical to the burden involved in negating the heat of passion on sudden provocation. Thus, we discern no unique hardship on the prosecution that would justify requiring the defendant to carry the burden of proving a fact so critical to criminal culpability.
也不是要求證明否定在我們的系統中獨特的刑事判例。緬因州本身要求控方（檢察官）超出合理的懷疑證明缺乏自我辯護（緬因州本身要求控方證明缺乏自衛無可置疑）。
滿足這負擔的強加義務，在全部實際效應內，是與否認參與在被突然挑釁的氣憤負擔相同。因此， 我們看出沒有任何獨特困難，對有正當理由起訴要求被告承擔證明事實，是如此重要的刑事責任。
IV
Maine law requires a defendant to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation in order to reduce murder to manslaughter. Under this burden of proof a defendant can be given a life sentence when the evidence indicates that it is as likely as not that he deserves a significantly lesser sentence. This is an intolerable result in a society where, to paraphrase Mr. Justice Harlan, it is far worse to sentence one guilty only of manslaughter as a murderer than to sentence a murderer for the lesser crime of manslaughter. In re Winship, 397 U.S., at 372 (concurring opinion). We therefore hold that the Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation when the issue is properly presented in a homicide case. Accordingly, the judgment below is
Affirmed.
緬因州法律要求被告建立一個優勢的證據 ，他這樣做是因處於氣憤的突發挑釁的時候 ，而把謀殺降低到過失殺人。根據這一舉證責任 ，證據表明時，很可能是因為他不值得一顯著較輕的判決，被告可能被判處無期徒刑。這是在一個社會裡無法容忍的結果， 套用大法官哈倫先生的意見，這是非常糟糕的判決，只有在一個犯謀殺的兇手，不是作為一個謀殺犯判決而判處較輕的一般殺人罪。In re Winship, 397 U.S., at 372 (concurring opinion同時發生意見). 因此，我們認為正當程序條款要求控方在超出合理的懷疑，證明缺乏在氣憤的突然挑釁上行動，當問題被正確地在一個殺人情況過程中提出時。同意肯定。
56. Patterson v. New York. Two years after it decided Mullaney v. Wilbur, the Supreme Court decided Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977), in which it considered the New York statutory formula for distinguishing second-degree murder and (voluntary) manslaughter.
The statute provided that a person is guilty of murder when “with intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such son or of a third person.” It provided further that it was an affirmative defense to charge of murder that the defendant “acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse . . .” Manslaughter was defined as intentionally causing the death of another person under the circumstances constituting an affirmative defense to murder. At Patterson's trial, the jury was instructed that the prosecution had to prove the facts establishing an intentional killing beyond a reasonable doubt; but that the defendant had the burden of proving the affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. In the Supreme Court, the defendant argued that these instructions were incorrect under Mullaney v. Wilbur.
56. Patterson v. New York.（帕特森v紐約）
對Mullaney v. Wilbur乙案下判決的兩年後 ，最高法院對Patterson v. New York乙案也作出判決 ，New York,432 U.S. 197 (1977), 在它認為 ，紐約的法定公式區分二級謀殺和（自願）過失殺人罪。該章程規定 ，一個人犯有謀殺罪時，「他的死亡原因是其兒子或第三人，而意圖導致另一人的死亡。」它提供了進一步的預防，這是積極的辯護，控告那些殺人被告「在極端情緒困擾的影響下，其中有一個合理解釋行動或者藉口。 . .」過失殺人罪如同故意造成他人死亡的情況下被定義，而積極辯解成謀殺。 在Patterson（帕特森）的審訊中，陪審團的指示 ，控方必須證明事實建立一個超出合理的懷疑故意殺人的事實；但是 ，被告有責任證明優勢證據的肯定防禦負擔。在最高法院，被告辯稱 ，這些指示是在 Mullaney v. Wilbur. 下錯誤。
The Maine murder statute, Me.Rev.stat.Ann., Tit. 17, j 2651 (1964), provides:
“'Whoever unlawfully kills a human being with malice aforethought, either express or implied, is guilty of murder and shall be punished by imprisonment for life.”
The manslaughter statute, Me.llev.stat,Ann., Tit. 17, j 2551 (196*, in relevant part provides: ''Whoever unlawfully kills a human being in the heat, of passion, on sudden provocation, without express or implied malice aforethought . . . shall be punished by a fine of a, not more than $1, 000 or by imprisonment for not more than 20 years . . .
Justice relinquish wrote a concurring opinion which Chief Justice Burger joined.
Weinfebrl|akl-aw 4th Ed.UCB-6
